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ABSTRACT 
 
To the unfamiliar, communities living in Meghalaya appear to be homogenous ones. In reality, 
however, they are socially, politically and culturally not only heterogeneous but are also defined by 
distinct tribal and clan markers. Three major tribes, namely, the Khasi, the Garo, and the Jaintia 
dominate the State. Each of them had their own kingdoms until they were brought under the British 
colonial administration in the 19th century. Consequently, after independence, these tribes and their 
territories were merged with undivided Assam, and then carved out as a full-fledged state of 
Meghalaya in 1972. Soon after attaining statehood, tensions cropped up between the indigenous 
communities and migrants mainly over the issue of economic opportunity. However, these days, it 
has slowly shifted towards the internal feuds among the indigenous tribes and separate demand for 
States within the State. With this background, the paper attempts to analyse the causes and 
consequences of autonomy demands asserted by different communities/tribes within the state.  
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1. Introduction   
‘Meghalaya’ meaning the ‘abode of clouds’ is one of the sister States of India’s North 
Eastern Region (NER hereafter)1, dominated mainly by three major tribes– the Khasi, the 
Garo, and the Jaintia. Each of them had their own kingdoms until they were annexed by the 
British administration one after another in the 19th Century (Das, 2007), Khasi Hills in 
1833, Jaintia Hills in 1835 and Garo Hills in 1872–73 (Haokip, 2013). Consequently, after 
the independence of the country, these tribes and their territories were merged with 
undivided Assam in 1835. Within no time, following the discontent among the people over 
the Assamese administration, the three autonomous district councils (Khasi, Garo and 
Jaintia ADCs) were carved out as a full-fledged State of Meghalaya in 1972 from Assam. 
Other smaller tribes, claimed to be the aboriginals of the State like the Kochs, the Hajongs, 
the Rabhas, the Mikirs, etc., have also been living for years along with the above three 
major tribes. In terms of demographic equation, as per population Census 2011, the Khasis 
constitute the largest community with 45 per cent of the State’s population, followed by the 
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Garos with 32.5 per cent, and the remaining 22.5 per cent composed of different 
communities, including the Jaintia, the Bengali, the Assamese, the Nepali/Gurkha and the 
Hindi speaking population. Geographically, the State covers a total area of 22,429 sq. km., 
and is surrounded by Assam in the east and north; and in the west and south by Bangladesh. 
Of the State’s total geographical area, about 37 per cent is covered by forest, which is 
notable for its biodiversity. Much of the forest area of the State is privately managed. The 
State government controls only the areas declared as reserved forest, which is about 4 per 
cent of the total area. 
To the unfamiliar, communities living in Meghalaya appear to be homogenous ones. In 
reality, however, they are socially, politically and culturally not only heterogeneous but are 
also defined by the distinct tribal and clan markers. Though the major communities, 
especially the Khasis and the Jaintias speak a similar language, they all have their own 
dialects, different from one another. Particularly, the Garos do speak a very different 
language and have different customs than any other communities in the State. Despite the 
Khasi and the Garo being the principal languages, English is used as an official language in 
the State. Exceptionally, they (tribes of Meghalaya) follow matrilineal system2. 
Soon after attaining Statehood in 1972, tensions cropped up between the indigenous 
communities (locals/natives) and the migrants (outsiders), mainly over the issue of 
economic opportunities. Major business establishments and job markets came to be 
dominated by the migrants. Consequently, the State witnessed three major riots between the 
indigenous communities and migrants. With the introduction of State policies to protect 
native communities (especially through the inner line permit, land holding policy, trade 
licensing policy, job reservation, protection of indigenous identity, etc.), the very tensions 
subsided in the 2000s. However, it has now slowly shifted to the indigenous tribes. 
Following a perceived development disparity, different indigenous ethnic schisms have 
developed in the State. On the other hand, community leaders and politicians often use the 
ethnic card primarily for economic and political benefits (Baruah, 1989), and in the process, 
alliance and re-alliance of different ethnic communities have also intensified. This very 
process of grouping communities on ethnic lines caused internal feuds, and consequently 
led to the movements for greater autonomy within the State. With this background, using 
secondary data, historical antecedents and observed facts, the present paper attempts to 
analyse the processes, causes and consequences of autonomy demands asserted by different 
tribes within the State in the recent past.  
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2. Ethnicity and State Formation  
In Meghalaya, the term ‘Khasi’ is used in a generic sense and encompasses five sub-tribes– 
the Khasi, Jaintia, Bhoi, Lyngngams and the War. They are mainly found in the four 
districts of east Meghalaya, namely– East Khasi Hills, West Khasi Hills, Ri-Bhoi and 
Jaintia Hills districts. The Jaintias are also known as ‘Pnars’ and settled in eastern part of 
the State. The Khasis who occupy the State’s northern lowlands and the foothills are 
generally called the ‘Bhoi’, those settled in the southern hill tracts are termed as ‘Wars’, 
and the ‘Lyngams’ tribe inhabit the north-western part. All the five sub-tribes are believed 
to have descended from the Ki-Hynniew-Trep3 and also known by the generic name– the 
Khasi–Pnars or simply ‘Khasi’ or ‘Hynniewtrep’. On the western part of the State, the four 
Garo Hills is predominantly inhabited by the Garos. The Garos belong to the Bodo family 
of the Tibeto-Burman race, believed to have migrated from Tibet (present Autonomous 
Region of China). The Garos are also known as the Achiks and the land they occupy is 
termed as the Achik land (Census of India, 2011).  
In 1960, the All Party Hills Leaders’ Conference (APHLC) of the then undivided Assam 
was formed. With the growth of tacit assertion of Assamese ethnic identity, discontent and 
antagonistic reaction among the tribal leaders against the ruling Assamese community 
escalated. As a result, the Meghalaya State was created on 21st January, 1972, following a 
concerted effort made by the combined tribal leadership of the Khasis, the Garos and the 
Jaintias under the flagship of the APHLC party (Upadhyaya, Upadhyaya & Yadav, 2013). 
The people of North Cachar Hills and Mikir Hills of Assam who were living closely with 
the Khasis and Garos decided not to join the new State– Meghalaya, albeit an option was 
given to them (Hussain, 1987; The Assam Tribune, 2013; Gohain, 2014).  
Historically, under the Government of India Act 1935, the hill areas of the then undivided 
Assam was grouped into two categories– (1) the Lushai (Mizo) and North Cachar Hills (NC 
Hills) which were classified as ‘excluded areas’; (2) the united Khasi and Jaintia hills 
districts with partial exception of Shillong town, which was the capital of Assam at that 
time, the Garo hills, Naga hills (present Nagaland) and Mikir (Karbi) hills of present Assam 
were classified as ‘partially excluded areas’. The government of Assam had no jurisdiction 
over the excluded areas, which were administered under the special power of the Governor. 
After the independence, the Constitution of India accepted broadly the spirit of the 
Government of India Act 1935, by providing each hill district an Autonomous District 
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Council with a fairly large autonomous power under the Sixth Schedule (Hussain, 1987). 
This led to the then hill districts of Assam, namely the Naga Hills, the Khasi-Jaintia Hills, 
the Garo Hills, and the Lushai Hills for the creation of new states, one after another. In this 
process, in 1972, the united Khasi-Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills formed the Meghalaya State. 
3. Movement against Outsiders  
Before Meghalaya attained Statehood, the Assamese community developed substantial 
holdings in Shillong (present State capital), which was also the capital of the then British 
Assam. The Assamese people, mainly the Bengali Assamese, hailed from Upper Assam 
and the Bengalis of Bangladesh (mainly the Hindus, after communal riots in Bangladesh) 
got employment opportunities in major government sectors and controlled business 
establishments. The steady rise of non-local migrants, mainly the Bengalis from 
Bangladesh, the Nepalese from Nepal and the Hindi speaking communities from the other 
parts of the country resulted in loss of economic opportunities for the indigenous 
communities. These migrants continued to dominate business establishments, labour force 
and other employment opportunities until recently. As a result, the State witnessed three 
ethnic riots between the indigenous communities and the migrant non-tribal communities. 
The first riot took place  in 1979 when the Bengalis were identified as the principal 
adversaries, followed by the conflict with the Nepalese who were viewed as the new 
adversaries in 1987 and then the clashes with the Biharis (from Bihar) and Marwaris (from 
Rajasthan) in 1992 (Haokip, 2013). In the 1980s, the Bengalis remained the prime target of 
the ethnic violence. As a result of which, in the early 1980s, approximately 25,000 to 
35,000 Bengalis permanently left Meghalaya. In 1981, there were 119,571 Bengalis living 
in Meghalaya, estimated at 8.13 per cent of the State’s population. Ten years later, in 1991, 
it got reduced to 5.97 per cent of population (Baruah, 2004; Phukan, 2013).  
Further, with the predicated cultural superiority of two tribal communities– the Khasis and 
the Garos over the non-tribal population, and politically motivated ethno-centrism led to the 
commission of many dreadful acts against non-tribal population of Meghalaya. This trend 
was more conspicuous in the Khasi Hills where the Khasis took a dominant political 
position in the newly created State. This led them to challenge the hitherto ascendancy of 
the non-tribal population (especially the Bengali speaking) who were often branded as 
‘Bangladeshis’, nationals of Bangladesh (Upadhyaya, et al., 2013). Of the various causes of 
conflicts, economic disparity emerged as the most prominent one in the post-statehood 
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period of Meghalaya. The State’s community-based agrarian economy lost much of its 
verve as a result of the unchecked privatisation of the community land, while the decline of 
agrarian resources made it extremely difficult for the members of the tribal population to 
maintain their livelihoods (Ibid, 2013).  
4. Internal Feud and Autonomy Movement  
Most of the modern ethnic conflict models say that the perceived deprivation of economic 
and political opportunities of the smaller communities by the larger communities, and the 
fear of loss of ethnic identity of these smaller communities primarily caused internal feuds 
in the society (Irobi, 2005; Singha, 2012). Following the perceived loss of economic 
opportunities in the hands of outsiders, Meghalaya witnessed first insurgent activities in the 
early 1980s with the birth of the Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), 
representing all indigenous communities of Khasi-Jaintia and Garo, to fight against the 
outsiders/Dkhars (Rammohan, 2007). In the 1990s, following the growth of internal 
squabbles, especially between Khasis and Garos, HALC was bifurcated into two groups– 
the Achik Liberation Matgrik Army (ALMA) in the Garo Hills, and the Hynniewtrep 
National Liberation Council (HNLC) in the Khasi Hills (Upadhyaya, et al., 2013; Rahman, 
2011). Later on, the AMLA was replaced by the Achik National Volunteers Council 
(ANVC). When the HNLC aimed at converting Meghalaya “as a province exclusively for 
the Khasi tribe and tried to free it from ‘domination’ by the Garo tribe”, the ANVC 
purportedly tried to carve out a homeland called ‘Achik Land’ exclusively for the Garos in 
Garo Hills. 
As understood, the HNLC is a product of 1992, bifurcated from the HALC, the first 
militant tribal outfit in Meghalaya. An important objective of the HNLC is to transform 
Meghalaya as a province exclusively for the Khasi tribe. The second objective is to fight 
against the presence of ‘outsiders’, as they feel that the Khasi youths are deprived off the 
fruits of development in the State. The HNLC was proscribed on November 16, 2000, and 
signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government of India (GoI) on July 23, 2004. The 
ANVC, which was formed in December 1995, aimed to carve out a homeland called ‘Achik 
Land’ in the areas of Garo Hills. The proposed ‘Achik Land’ comprises the present districts 
of Garo Hills in Meghalaya and a large chunk of Kamrup and Goalpara districts of Assam, 
where a large number of Garos are living4.  
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The Garos living in the western part of the State claimed that their region continues to 
remain ‘backward’ and there has been economic ‘disparity’ ever since the State was carved 
out of Assam in 1972. The situation in this area is all the more disconcerting for its 
inhabitants as compared to those in the relatively developed region of the Khasi Hills. The 
Garo Hills’ meagre infrastructure and essential services, scanty health and education 
facilities, and poor connectivity to the rest of Meghalaya accentuated the sense of relative 
deprivation in the State (Upadhyaya, et al., 2013). This perceived deprivation, disparity and 
exclusivity led to the demand for a separate State exclusively for the Garos, comprising five 
Garo hills districts reflected in Figure 1, by carving out from the Khasis. In this context, the 
Garo National Council (GNC) legislator Clifford R. Marak officially put up this issue in the 
60 Member Meghalaya Legislative Assembly on 18th March 2014 (The Hindu, 2014a). 
Former parliamentarian and speaker of Lok Sabha, Mr. P.A. Sangma justified the demand 
for ‘Garo Land’, citing the reason for development disparity in the State (Haokip, 2013). 
However, their claim was rejected by the ruling Congress-led Meghalaya United Alliance 
(UMA) government, stating that further division of the State would crop up more 
constraints on the resources and increase social and economic vulnerability (News, 2014). 
On the other side, the proscribed HNLC has not only been working for the Khasi Land 
exclusively, but also striving to drive out the outsiders from the Khasi and the Jaintia 
regions, especially those in the disputed border areas of the State (Understanding 
Meghalaya, 2010).  
People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M) is a relatively new terrorist group, backed 
by the Garos and operating in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya. The outfit has been re-
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christened as the Achik National Council (ANC). Most of the ALMA terrorists surrendered 
in 1994, but a few formed the ANVC in 1995. The PLF-M consists of some of the 
“surrendered rebels” of the erstwhile ALMA who returned underground after their 
rehabilitation scheme failed. The main objective of the PLF-M has been to achieve faster 
economic development of the Garo Hills, as well as better educational opportunities for the 
Garo tribes. Of course, the ultimate demand of the group is for a separate State for the 
Garos. In this regard, in March 2001, Chengku Momin, the Minister for Information and 
Publicity of the PLF-M had warned all the non-Garos, not to contest the State Assembly 
and district council elections that was held in  20035. 
Mushrooming militant groups in the State has become a cause of concern. Fractional 
groups have added oil to the fire, and no two groups have meeting ground. Within Garo 
community, the ANVC differs from the other Garo separatist organisations. The Garo 
National Council (GNC) aims for a Garo State comprising present districts of the Garo 
hills, while, the ANVC demands the present districts of the Garo Hills in Meghalaya and 
large chunks of Kamrup and Goalpara districts of Assam (Understanding Meghalaya, 
2010). When the ANVC and its splinter group, ANVC-B are officially under ceasefire with 
the GoI, the United Achik Liberation Army (UALA) and the Achik National Liberation 
Army (ANLA) formed in October 2013, and are active in the interior areas of the Garo 
Hills and its adjoining areas of Assam and the West Khasi Hills. The Garo National 
Liberation Army (GNLA) was subsequently formed in 2009, under the leadership of a 
former Deputy Superintendent of Police of Meghalaya, P.R. Sangma alias Champion R. 
Sangma, after deserting the Police Force. Mr. Sohan D. Shira, former ANVC ‘area 
commander’ for the East Garo Hills is the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ of the outfit (GNLA). 
The cadre base of the outfit is mainly formed by deserters from ANVC, Liberation of Achik 
Elite Force (LAEF) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Since its 
formation, the GNLA has been involved in killing, abduction, extortion, bomb blasts and 
attacks on Security Forces (SFs). The law and order situation in the Garo-dominated areas 
has deteriorated after the outfit was formed6. Meanwhile, ANVC suffered a further split in 
mid-November 2013 when seven of its members deserted the designated camp where they 
had been living since the truce and formed a new outfit, adding to the murky scene (Das, 
2013).   
To be very precise, the cause of disagreement between the Khasis and the Garos is mainly 
because of the perceived uneven distribution of economic and political powers, especially 
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the implementation of the 1971 Reservation Bill7. The hegemony of the Khasis was felt 
during 2005 when the Meghalaya Board of School Education (MBSE), which had its head 
office in Tura (in West Garo Hills), agreed to reorganise itself in Shillong (Khasi area) 
along the lines demanded by the Khasi Students’ Union (KSU). Undoubtedly, these 
episodes shaped the embittered situation between the Khasis and the Garos, which further 
led to violence. The subsequent massive outcries have been caused due to demand of the 
Garos for a separate State (Upadhyaya, et al., 2013). The demonstrations and agitations 
were intensified in the State by the Garo Hills State Movement Committee (GHSMC), a 
conglomeration of various pressure groups and political groups of the Garo community. 
Their ultimate demand is that the GoI should consider creation of two separate States—one 
each for Garos and Khasi-Jaintia based on linguistic lines as envisaged in the States Re-
organisation Act, 1956. The Garo National Council (GNC) and the Garo Students’ Union 
(GSU) are demanding a separate State for the Garos on linguistic lines, while the Hill State 
People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP) is demanding a Khasi-Jaintia State. These differences 
among them in terms of their demands have further caused unrest in Meghalaya in 2000s.   
5. Discussion of the Study  
Since the mid-1990s, following the concerted efforts made by the Government and the 
community leaders, there has been a considerable improvement in the ethnic relations 
between the tribes and migrants in the State. After getting assurance from the Chief 
Minister, E.K Mawlong, various fierce movements especially the Khasi Students’ Union, 
against the outsiders had been withdrawn in September 2001. The demand includes 
removal of the Nagas, Mizos and Kukis from the official list of indigenous tribes of 
Meghalaya. According to Srikanth (2005), the largest and the most influential community, 
the Khasis, who were vehemently agitating against the outsiders, are now becoming more 
matured and consequently, the State of Meghalaya today is definitely not what it was in the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
Literally, the State of Meghalaya is not comparable to some other states of NER like– 
Manipur, Nagaland and Mizoram, in terms of historical, social, political and demographic 
equation. Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya was a British outpost and later the capital of 
undivided Assam which included almost all the hill States of present NER (e.g. Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Meghalaya). As a result, Shillong (the East Khasi Hills district) or Meghalaya in 
general had received a sizeable non-tribal population before the Statehood was conferred. 
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The major portions of the Khasi region (including Jaintias and Ri-Bhoi) in its eastern and 
northern boundary share border with Assam’s four districts– Kamrup, Karbi-Anglong, N.C. 
Hills and Cachar. Similarly, the Garo Hills districts share border with Assam’s Goalpara 
and Dhubri districts. Besides, the State shares almost 450 km long porous border along 
its southern and western boundary with Bangladesh. Therefore, the people of Meghalaya 
cannot just isolate themselves from the history and pretend to write on a clean slate that 
they are the lone indigenous community in the State (Mukhim, 2013). Violence against the 
outsiders or migrants cannot solve the predicaments that they perceive. The indigenous 
communities become outsider when they move out of their respective homes. If outsiders 
are to be targeted, the same may be expected when they move out of the state (Meghalaya). 
One should consider the limitations of the others and respect other communities’ 
difficulties (Singha, 2012). In this context, seeing the new ethnic movements in Meghalaya, 
Mukhim (2013) further raised few questions– “[w]hen we need a good doctor, do we check 
his tribe, caste, class or do we repose our faith on his expertise and his credentials? The 
same is the case with a good teacher or lawyer. So, if we are inter-dependent then is it not 
fair to share a slice of the cake with those who strive to build Meghalaya as much as the 
tribes of Meghalaya do?”  
Although the relation between the tribes (indigenous communities) and non-tribes 
(migrants from outside) improved in 2000s, ethnic tensions in Meghalaya shifted to the so 
called indigenous tribes, causing internal conflicts in the recent past (Haokip, 2013). In 
reality, the internal squabble was an accumulated effect, started right after the Statehood 
period (Upadhyaya, et al., 2013). Following a perceived deprivation, the Khasis demanded 
revision of 1971 Reservation Bill. At the same time, Garos felt marginalised by the 
majority Khasis. For instances, KSU demanded 50 per cent of government jobs for Khasi-
Jaintias combined, Jaintia Students’ Union (JSU) demanded that all the three major 
indigenous groups, the Khasis, the Garos and the Jaintias should get 30 per cent each and 
the remaining 10 per cent should be given to other communities (Srikanth, 2005). But the 
key questions rose in this context are– who is being relatively deprived-off and by whom? 
Which district or tribe is deprived-off?  
To begin with, Table 1 depicts district-wise literacy rate, density of population and decadal 
population growth rate, while Table 2 shows the percentage change in Below Poverty Line8 
(BPL) families in different districts over the years. Considering a lesser growth rate of 
population and higher literacy rate as better development indicators, East Khasi Hill being 
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an administrative district and having within it the State Capital, Shillong, it performed well 
in both aspects. While the other districts, whether the Garo Hills or Khasi Hills were found 
to be performing more or less the same. Of course, the percentage change in rural BPL 
households in Khasi districts have improved considerably well vis-a-vis the Garo hills over 
the years from 1990s to 2000s. In terms of annual average sectoral growth rates across the 
districts (Table 3), as expected, the East Khasi Hills district registered higher growth in all 
the three sectors– primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Ri-Bhoi district (Khasi region) 
also performed equally well. South Garo Hills district performed slightly better than that of 
any other Garo hills districts in this regard, but lesser than that of the Khasi Hills districts.  
While referring to the physical infrastructure (Table 4), barring West Khasi hills district, 
the rest of the Khasi districts performed much better as compared to the State average in 
terms of percentage of villages connected by pucca road and electricity connection in 1991 
and 2001 respectively. Ironically, in totality, the socio-economic indices depicted in Table 
5 (using F. Bourgignon index),9 consisting of economic, health, education and Human 
Development Index (HDI) highlighted a different picture. Overall, the socio-economic 
indices of the South Garo Hills district reveals relatively better performances bypassing 
East Khasi hills district, which was considered to be the most developed district in the 
State. These findings convoluted to draw a conclusion that the Garo region is deprived of 
socio-economic indicators. Conversely, one cannot infer either that the Khasi region is 
better off in every socio-economic indicator.     
In reality, the fiasco over the transfer of MBSE office from Tura to Shillong (as argued by 
Haokip, 2013) was not the genesis of ethnic divide between Khasi and Garo in Meghalaya. 
Economic and political factors have more influence on this. As analysed above, one can 
argue that the Garos belong to the Bodo family, who are concentrated in the present Assam 
and spearheading separatist movement for their homeland in Assam. At the same time, a 
sizable number of Garo populations are also found in Assam. The GNC is fighting for the 
portion of the Garo dominated areas (Garo hill districts) of the present Meghalaya, while 
the ANVC is quite optimistic and ambitious to incorporate Garo hill districts of Meghalaya 
and some of the adjoining districts of the present Assam. Even the State Ministers (e.g. 
Social Welfare Minister Ms. D.C. Marak) support and involve with the outfit (The Hindu, 
2014b). They do not want to be dictated by the Khasis. On the other hand, the Khasis want 
to enjoy their privilege of dominance and do not want to sacrifice their legacy of movement 
against the outsiders in the hands of any other community, especially the Garos.  
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Secondly, had the Karbis and the Mikirs of the present Assam joined Meghalaya at the time 
when they were given a chance to be part of the State in 1972, there could have been a 
different situation. If the demand for a separate State of the Garos or the Khasis is 
considered, one can easily expect another demand or re-alignment of the present State 
boundary by amalgamating other smaller communities like, the Kochs, the Hajongs, the 
Rabhas, the Mikirs, etc. who have been living for years along with the three major tribes in 
Meghalaya. Having thought of these consequences, in response to the Garos’ demand for a 
separate State raised by GNC legislator C.R. Marak in the Meghalaya Legislative 
Assembly, the Deputy Chief Minister in-charge Mr. R.C. Laloo replied that “there was 
economic disparity among the people of the State and also overall economic condition of 
the people of the State especially in rural areas. It is our duty to take necessary steps to 
ameliorate the economic hardship of our people and bring about all round economic 
improvement in the State and not to divide it” (The Hindu, 2014a). 
Third, the identity assertion of the Rabhas has given rise to ethnic conflict between the 
Rabhas and non-Rabhas (especially Garos) within Rabha Hasong areas in Assam and east 
Garo hills in Meghalaya in December 2010 and January 2011. The problem started when 
the Rabha Hasong demand area included 416 villages inhabited by Garo people which also 
formed a part of the proposed area demanded by GNC as a separate Garo Autonomous 
Council in Assam. At the same time, the ANVC is fighting for amalgamation of the present 
districts of the Garo Hills in Meghalaya and a large chunk of Kamrup and Goalpara 
districts of Assam. In reality, the Rabhas are recognised as Scheduled Caste category in 
Goalpara district of Assam but not in the contiguous East Garo Hills district of Meghalaya. 
The East Garo Hills district has its own Autonomous District Council under the Sixth 
Schedule of the Constitution of India. But because the Rabhas are not a Scheduled Tribe 
community in Meghalaya, they never had their representation in the elected district council. 
For quite some time, the Rabhas had been agitating in the Garo Hills in Meghalaya for 
gaining Scheduled Tribe status, but the Garos opposed to it. Therefore, the Rabhas resorted 
to call for road blockade in certain parts of Assam (Goalpara and Kamrup districts) that 
links between the two areas of Meghalaya– the Garo Hills and Khasi Hills. If one has to 
travel from Tura, the headquarters of Garo Hills to Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya 
situated in Kashi Hills, one has to go through Assam via Goalpara and Guwahati (Kamrup 
district)10. 
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Last, but not the least, the larger issue that hardly any scholar has exposed is ‘the 
exploitation of the indigenous tribes by their respective elite sections’. Most of the 
community lands have been grabbed by the elite land grabbers, coal baron for their vested 
interests. Very systematically, in the pretext of tribal land ownership, the elite sections of 
the community (who include coal barons, politicians, bureaucrats, policemen and even 
surrendered militants) with the tacit support of the village headmen converting the common 
forest land into individual lands and using them. As a consequence of which the poor 
villagers are becoming landless, their livelihoods are curtailed, environment is devastated 
and rivers are polluted. In this context, Mohrmen (2014) opined that unlike in the other 
States in the country, the problem in Meghalaya is not because of the outsiders, but the 
threat is from the rich tribal elites who are themselves members of the community. For 
instances, these same people who under the pretext of tribal rights to land ownership (a 
customary practice), have violated another tradition of protecting and preserving nature 
which the tribal call their mother. 
6. Concluding Remarks  
As we have discussed above, though Meghalaya is relatively better off in terms of conflict 
and violence situation than its NER counterparts, one cannot completely ignore the tensions 
that have escalated in the post-statehood periods. In addition, the State has experienced a 
series of communal riots between the outsiders and insiders since the late 1970s. However, 
in the recent past, the ethnic tension which was heightened between the tribes (indigenous 
groups) and non-tribes (migrants) have now slowly shifted towards the indigenous tribes in 
2000s. This ultimately has led to the demand for creation of separate States, both by the 
Khasis and the Garos for their own. Perceived economic and political discrimination among 
the major communities, especially the Khasis and Garos has caused tensions between them. 
The Khasis are blaming the Garos and vice-versa. How the ethnic tension which was 
directed against the outsiders got shifted towards inter and intra tribe conflict and the issues 
of rationality of their internal autonomy movements have been the bone of contentions in 
the present paper.         
Following a united struggle of the three dominant indigenous communities, namely, the 
Khasis, the Jaintias and the Garos, the Meghalaya State came into existence in 1972. Even 
in the post-statehood period, the movements against the outsiders were made in unison by 
all the indigenous tribes of the State. Shillong was developed as an educational centre, 
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added the North-Eastern Hill University in the post-statehood, led to growth of higher 
education in the State at the fast pace. The anxiety about the employment among the 
educated youth started when the employment opportunity growth in the State was 
proportionately lower than that of the higher education and the existing employment, 
business establishments had already been occupied by the outsiders. This was the major 
cause of conflicts between the outsiders and the tribes in 1980s, exacerbated in 1990s and 
witnessed three riots against the outsiders. As discussed above, after getting assurance from 
the then Chief Minister, the aggressive movements led by the KSU subsided and taken 
more matured steps. Their demands starting from reservation policy to monitoring of trade 
licences to the outsiders, from tribal land holding issue to driving out outsiders. Slowly, the 
KSU formed political party and the leader, Paul Lyngdoh joined the then Chief Minister 
D.D. Lapang’s cabinet as Minister of sports and youth affairs in 2003. Interestingly, 
Lyngdoh himself found it difficult to deliver demands that was initiated by him. Still, the 
Khasis being the majority community, especially in the Shillong, the KSU played a 
decisive role in the State politics, influencing the government and the political parties. 
Their hegemonic role had in fact shrunk the democratic space for the rise of other 
organisations within the State. This exclusivity led to internal squabble, slowly shifted to 
internecine struggle against each other within the State. Against the Khasi hegemony, in the 
Garo Hills, the Garos called for a bandh and protested against the Khasis (Srikanth, 2005). 
Other smaller tribes have also followed Garos and the organisations have slowly been 
divided broadly into two, on the ethnic line— Khasi-Jaintia united and Garo. Further, the 
Garos’ demand for Garo Land was heavily opposed by the Rabhas and they also want their 
basic rights as their fellow members get in Assam across the State. 
As the bone of contention between the communities in the State has been identified as the 
economic and political one, the demand for separate States for their own cannot be the 
panacea for infighting situation. If one thinks and analyses logically, there is no guarantee 
that the Garos will not demand for the integration of the Garos of Meghalaya with the 
Garos living in Assam or even with the Bodo community of Assam in the near future (as 
the Garo is a Bodo family), and also the GNLA cadres consisting of Bodo militant splinters 
of Assam. On the other, there is also no guarantee that the Jaintias will not fight for their 
identity or separation from Khasis in the near future, as they are also a major constituent 
group in the larger Khasi ethnic identity. The same holds good for the communities like, the 
Bhois, the Wars or any other sub-tribes of the larger Khasi ethnic or linguistic group. As we 
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have seen the riots between Rabhas and Garos in 2010 and 2011, one can expect Rabhas’ 
share in Garo hills.  
Therefore, instrumentalist way of politicising and polarising communities by their elite 
leaders for economic or personal vote stunt opportunities would only aggravate the present 
crisis of Meghalaya. Rather, the State should strive to further uplift her economy with due 
emphasis on equitable distribution of resources and fruits of development. Otherwise, the 
ethnic conflict will definitely ransom and slow down development initiatives in the State. 
The more we stress on the conglomeration ethnic-based identity, the sharper will be the 
contours for conflict in the society. Meghalaya being a State of multi-tribes and 
communities, one should learn to live in coexistence and accommodative spirit. As the two 
major warring communities of the State— the Khasi and the Garos are ethnically 
heterogeneous, linguistically different and geographically isolated, there seems to be locked 
in bitter internecine struggles against each other. Therefore, inter community relation can 
be improved by improving inter-district connectivity particularly the road networks 
between the two geographically isolated towns, Tura and Shillong (main towns of Garo and 
Khasi hills respectively). Otherwise, it makes very limited interaction between the two 
major communities (Khasi and Garo) in Meghalaya and consequently develops distrust 
among them.     
Acknowledgement: This paper is an abridged version of the paper presented in the 
National Convention at GIDR, Ahmadabad on February 11, 2015.   
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Annexure Tables 
 
Table 1: District-wise Literacy and Population Growth Rate (in %) 
Districts 
 
Literacy Rate                 Population Growth Rate Density of 
Population 2001 2011 1991-01 2001-11 
East Garo Hills 62 76 33 26 122 
West Garo Hills 51 68 29 27 173 
South Garo Hills 64 72 31 29 77 
Jaintia Hills 53 63 36 31 103 
Ri-Bhoi 55 77 51 34 109 
East Khasi Hills 75 85 23 25 292 
West Khasi Hills 66 79 34 30 73 
Meghalaya 63 75 31 28 132 
Source: Census (2011 provisional); Govt. of Meghalaya (2008); Govt. of Meghalaya (2006) 
 
Table 2: District-wise Rural BPL Households in Meghalaya (in %) 
Districts 1991 1998 2002 
East Garo Hills 68.5 34.2 55.9 
West Garo Hills 66.2 63 53.7 
South Garo Hills                                                            – 70.6 45.3 
Jaintia Hills 56.1 44.2 39.5 
Ri-Bhoi                                     – 41.8 49.9 
East Khasi Hills 33.2 55.2 46.7 
West Khasi Hills 29.2 64.9 47.7 
Meghalaya 48.9 54.5 48.9 
Source: Saxena (2002) 
 
Table 3: District-wise Sectoral Average Annual Gr. Rate (1999-00 to 2007-08) at 1999-00 Constant Prices 
Sector Agriculture Primary Secondary Tertiary NSDP 
Jaintia Hills 2.65 7.32 8.98 5.68 6.97 
East Khasi Hills 10.37 10.09 12.05 6.86 8.07 
West Khasi Hills 4.64 5.49 7.53 4.76 5.51 
Ri-Bhoi 6.41 6.35 27.03 6.36 9.25 
East Garo Hills 1.71 2.21 19.15 5.07 5.8 
West Garo Hills 4.11 4.23 10.69 6.18 6.1 
South Garo Hills 6.91 8.15 11.61 5.17 7.51 
Meghalaya 5.52 6.53 12.42 6.27 7.19 
Source: Govt. of Meghalaya (2008) 
 
Table 4: District-wise Road and Electricity Connectivity 
Districts 
 
% of Village Connected by Pucca Road  
(in 1991) 
% of Electrified Villages  
(in 2001) 
East Garo Hills 12.7 33.22 
West Garo Hills 12.7 36.49 
South Garo Hills 10.1 19.66 
Jaintia Hills 27.1 62.31 
Ri-Bhoi 19.3 66.11 
East Khasi Hills 26.2 74.13 
West Khasi Hills 11.9 35.28 
Meghalaya 16.4 44.93 
Source: Govt. of Meghalaya (2008) 
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Table 5: District-wise Bourguignon* Socio-economic Indices (In order of Rank)  
Districts Economic Education Health HDI 
East Garo Hills 5 3 5 5 
West Garo Hills 4 2 7 3 
South Garo Hills 1 1 3 1 
Jaintia Hills 7 7 1 6 
Ri-Bhoi 3 4 4 4 
East Khasi Hills 2 6 2 2 
West Khasi Hills 6 5 6 7 
Source: Nayak and Ray (2010) 
*Bourguignon Index is an inequality index, measured as: 
  
where α is related to the degree of aversion of the society with respect to inequality and the degree of substitution is 
normally set to be β ≤ 1. 
 
  
End Note: 
                                               
1 India’s NER consists of seven states– Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. 
Later on, the state of Sikkim joined in the region’s fabric in 2002. At present, including Sikkim, NER consists of eight states.   
2 A matrilineal society is a society in which lineage, birthright and social classification are traced through the mother’s 
ancestry. A key detail of the society is the favoritism of daughters over sons. This is related to the idea that the mother’s 
familial line determines position within society, rather than the father’s. 
3 ‘Ki-Hynniew-Trep’ refers to ‘Seven Huts’ or ‘Seven Families’, the first settlers on earth according to their (Khasis) legend. 
4 This section is excerpted from Understanding Meghalaya (2010). 
5 Excerpted from SATP: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/plf_m.htm] 
6 Retrieved from SATP: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/Meghalaya/terrorist_outfits/GNLA.htm] 
7 The 1971 Reservation Bill specified quotas of 40% for the Khasi and the Jaintia, 50% for the Garo, and 10% for the 
minorities in government jobs and educational institutions.  
8 Below Poverty Line (BPL) is an economic benchmark and poverty threshold used by the government of India to indicate 
economic disadvantage and to identify individuals and households in need of government assistance and aid. According to 
Dandekar and Rath Committee, “an average calorie norm of 2,250 calories per capita per day for both rural and urban 
areas”, are defined as the poverty line. 
9 Please Refer to Nayak and Ray (2010). 
10 This section is heavily excerpted from [http://www.claws.in/1082/the-rabha-garo-conundrum-jaikhlong-basumatry.html] 
